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NEW WORD, SAME PROBLEMS: ENTRY, ARRIVAL,
AND THE ONE-YEAR DEADLINE FOR ASYLUM
SEEKERS
Joanna R. Mareth
Abstract: The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA) imposed a one-year filing deadline on all applications for asylum. Under this law,
an alien applying for asylum bears the burden of showing that he or she applied for asylum
within one year of arrival into the United States. The word "arrival" is not defined in
immigration law, but the Second Circuit recently held that not every border crossing into the
country is an "arrival" for purposes of the asylum filing deadline. The court's reasoning was
reminiscent of the U.S. Supreme Court's 1963 decision in Rosenberg v. Fleuti, which held
that a lawful permanent resident does not make an "entry" into the United States upon
returning from an "innocent, casual, and brief" trip abroad. This Comment examines the
meaning of the word "arrival" as used in the asylum filing deadline and argues that Congress
has inadvertently created a new Fleuti debate over when travel outside the country is
meaningfully interruptive of an asylum seeker's presence in the United States. It further
argues that federal courts have jurisdiction to consider the proper meaning of the word
"arrival" in the one-year rule and should do so according to legislative intent, which was not
to use the filing deadline to preclude legitimate refugees from seeking asylum in the United
States.
Dinesh is from Nepal.t The son of a political activist, he lived in the
United States from 1999-2005. Almost immediately upon returning to
Nepal in 2005, Dinesh was kidnapped and beaten by Maoist rebels who
opposed his father's activities. They told Dinesh he would have to join
the armed faction of their rebellion or be killed. In April of 2006, Dinesh
escaped and fled to the United States. He was detained at the border,
where he asked for asylum to stay in the United States. Although Dinesh
filed his application for asylum within three months, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) claimed that Dinesh was ineligible because
he did not seek asylum within one year of "arrival," as required by law.
ICE asserted that because Dinesh had lived in the United States
previously, his return in 2006 was not an "arrival" under the asylum law.
Instead, ICE contended Dinesh would have needed to apply within one
year of his 1999 entry to be eligible for asylum.
1. Hypothetical scenario based on an actual case pending before an Immigration Judge in Seattle
at this writing. Some identifying details have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the
asylum seeker.
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Under United States law, an alien2 seeking asylum in this country has
one year from the date of arrival to file an application for asylum with
the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS).3
Federal regulations clarify that the one-year deadline is calculated "from
the date of the alien's last arrival in the United States."4 However, the
word "arrival" is not defined in the one-year rule for asylum applications
or elsewhere in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the main
body of U.S. immigration law.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the only federal court of
appeals to squarely address the issue thus far, has concluded that not
every border crossing is an "arrival" for purposes of the one-year
deadline.6 The court held that an asylum applicant who had resided in
the United States for nearly a decade did not "arrive" in the United
States when he returned from a three-week visit to his home country
taken pursuant to a grant of advance parole by immigration authorities.7
In a subsequent, unpublished decision, the Second Circuit noted with
approval an Immigration Judge's decision to disregard an asylum
applicant's claimed "last arrival" date when calculating the one-year
deadline because the alleged arrival "followed a brief trip to Canada
rather than a flight from persecution."
8
Congress imposed the filing deadline on asylum applications as part
of the sweeping Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). 9 IIRIRA also stripped the federal
courts of jurisdiction to review claims relating to the timeliness of an
2. An "alien" is a person who is not a citizen or national of the United States. See 8 U.S.C.
§ I 101(a)(3) (2000).
3. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 208(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § l158(a)(2)(B) (2000). The
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was abolished by the Homeland Security Act of
2002. Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 471, 116 Stat. 2135, 2205 (to be codified at 6 U.S.C. § 291(a)).
Asylum applications are now adjudicated by USCIS, a part of the Department of Homeland
Security. Id. § 451(b)(3) (to be codified at 6 U.S.C. § 271(b)(3)).
4. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(2)(ii) (2005) (emphasis added).
5. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537.
6. See Joaquin-Porras v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 172, 179 (2d Cir. 2006); Lumaj v. Gonzales, 174 F.
App'x 606, 608 (2d Cir. 2006).
7. Joaquin-Porras, 435 F.3d at 179. Advance parole is a type of travel document issued by
USCIS to permit certain aliens to re-enter the United States after traveling abroad. See 8 C.F.R. §
223; see also U.S. Customs & Border Patrol, Advance Parole,
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/travellid_visa/what-adv-parole/adv.parole.xml (last visited Jan. 13,
2007).
8. Lumaj, 174 F. App'x at 608.
9. Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 604(a), 110 Stat. 3009-690 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)).
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asylum application.' ° Congress intended the deadline to prevent aliens
from asserting frivolous asylum claims as a defense after deportation
proceedings had been commenced against them, or otherwise misusing
the asylum system." It did not intend the filing deadline to preclude
bona fide refugees from seeking asylum.
12
Many legitimate refugees do not plan to seek asylum when they first
arrive in the United States. 13 Some may pursue other legal immigration
options first. 14 Others may return to their home countries several times
before making the difficult decision that the situation is too dangerous to
permit returning home permanently. 15 But for how long and for what
purposes may an alien depart the United States such that the person
makes a new "arrival" under the asylum law upon returning? In the
absence of clear guidance from Congress, immigration officials and the
courts must consider when a departure from the United States
sufficiently interrupts the applicant's presence in the United States so as
to warrant a new "arrival" date upon return.
In the 1963 immigration law case Rosenberg v. Fleuti,16 the U.S.
Supreme Court considered the plight of a lawful permanent resident
(LPR)17 whose deportability turned on whether his return from a short
visit to Mexico constituted an "entry" into the United States. 18 The Court
avoided deporting Fleuti by holding that an "innocent, casual, and brief
excursion" is not "meaningfully interruptive"' 9 of an LPR's presence in
10. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3). The REAL ID Act of 2005 conferred on the federal courts of appeal
jurisdiction over "constitutional claims or questions of law." See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (West
2005); see also infra Part IV.A.
11. See Leena Khandwala et al., The One-Year Bar: Denying Protection to Bona Fide Refugees,
Contrary to Congressional Intent and Violative of International Law, IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS, Aug.
2005, at 4.
12. See id. at 5.
13. See Michele R. Pistone, Asylum Filing Deadlines: Unfair and Unnecessary, 10 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 95, 97 (1996) ("Contrary to a common misperception, asylum seekers typically do not enter the
United States with the intent to apply for asylum.").
14. Id. at 99-100.
15. See, e.g., id.; Silva v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 448 F.3d 1229, 1234 (1lth Cir. 2006) (noting that
asylum seeker returned briefly to Columbia despite fear of persecution because she thought "things
might be different").
16. 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
17. "LPR" is defined at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (2000). LPRs are often referred to as "green-card"
holders. See Etuk v. Slattery, 936 F.2d 1433, 1437 (2d Cir. 1991) ("[T]he green card is the most
widely utilized and accepted means of proving LPR status.").
18. Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 452-53.
19. Id. at 462.
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the country and therefore does not require an "entry" upon return.2°
More than three decades of case law followed the Fleuti decision, in
which the courts attempted to define an "innocent, casual, and brief
excursion" on a case by case basis, 21 before IIRIRA established a
statutory framework for determining when an LPR who travels abroad
must seek "admission" at the border.22
This Comment argues that by failing to define the word "arrival" in
the one-year rule for asylum applications, Congress has invited another
Fleuti debate about when a return to the United States is an "arrival" for
purposes of the filing deadline. Part I discusses the one-year rule and the
legislative history behind the law. Part II examines the meaning of the
word "arrival" and analyzes the Second Circuit's recent decisions that an
asylum seeker does not make an "arrival" upon returning from certain
brief trips outside the country. Part III demonstrates the relevance of the
Fleuti doctrine, which held that an LPR does not make an "entry" upon
returning from "innocent, casual, and brief' excursions abroad. Part IV
examines the federal courts' jurisdiction to consider the proper
interpretation of the word "arrival" in the one-year rule. Finally, Part V
argues that courts should interpret the word "arrival" so as to discourage
frivolous applications but not to prevent bona fide refugees from seeking
asylum in the United States.
I. AN ASYLUM SEEKER MUST APPLY FOR ASYLUM WITHIN
ONE YEAR OF ARRIVAL OR MEET CERTAIN EXCEPTIONS
Under international treaty and domestic law, the United States may
not return a refugee to a country where he or she would face
23persecution. In 1996, in order to address perceived abuses of the
asylum process,2 4 Congress created a rule requiring all asylum seekers to
apply for asylum within one year of arriving in the United States. 25 The
one-year deadline may be extended at the discretion of an immigration
20. Id.
21. See Tineo v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 382, 385 (3d Cir. 2003) (referring to "over three decades of
practice based on the Fleuti doctrine").
22. See 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(13)(C).
23. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, 268 (incorporating by reference the terms of the Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, Apr. 24, 1954, 189 U.N.T.S. 2545).
24. See Khandwala et al., supra note 11, at 4, see also PHILIP G. SCHRAG, A WELL-FOUNDED
FEAR: THE CONGRESSIONAL BATTLE TO SAVE POLITICAL ASYLUM IN AMERICA 31-32 (2000).
25. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B).
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official for certain changed or extraordinary circumstances.26 Legislative
history shows that, while Congress wished to deter spurious claims, it
did not intend to use the filing deadline to deny asylum to legitimate
refugees.27
A. Asylum Is a Form of Discretionary Relief Available to Refugees
As a signatory to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, the United States may not return a refugee to a country where
his or her life or freedom would be threatened.28 A refugee is a person
who is outside his or her country of nationality and unable or unwilling
to return home on account of a "well-founded fear" of persecution based
on race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion.29 Any alien present in the United States or arriving at a
port of entry may ask for asylum, regardless of whether he or she is in
the country legally.30 An alien who is found to meet the definition of a
refugee and who is not ineligible on other grounds 31 may be granted
asylum. 32 After one year, an asylee can apply to become a lawful
permanent resident.
33
B. An Applicant for Asylum Must File Within One Year of Last Arrival
or Show Changed or Extraordinary Circumstances
IIRIRA imposed a one-year filing deadline on all applications for
asylum.34 Effective April 1, 1997, an alien seeking asylum must show
26. Id. § 11 58(a)(2)(D). This Comment uses the term "immigration official" to refer to an asylum
officer, Immigration Judge, or the Bureau of Immigration Appeals (BIA).
27. See infra Part I.C.
28. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 23, at 6223 (incorporating by
reference the terms of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Apr. 24, 1954, 189
U.N.T.S. 2545). The Refugee Act of 1980 incorporated the treaty obligations into United States law.
Pub. L. No. 96-212, , 94 Stat. 102, 107. Before that, refugees were permitted to stay on an ad hoc
basis. See Michele R. Pistone & Philip G. Schrag, The New Asylum Rule: Improved But Still Unfair,
16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 7 n.36 (2001).
29. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
30. Id. § 1158(a)(1).
31. An alien may be found ineligible for asylum if, for example, he or she is eligible to be
removed to a safe third country, has been convicted of a particularly serious crime, or is found to be
a "danger to the security of the United States." Id. § II 58(b)(2)(A).
32. Id. § 1158(b)(1).
33. Id. § 1159(b).
34. Id. § 1158(a). The one-year deadline does not apply to withholding of removal. See id.
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"by clear and convincing evidence" that the asylum application was filed
within one year of the alien's arrival in the United States.35 Federal
implementing regulations specify that the one-year period "shall be
calculated from the date of the alien's last arrival in the United States."
36
In response to concerns that a time limit for asylum claims could be
impracticable or onerous,37 Congress authorized an exception to the
deadline for applicants who can show "changed" or "extraordinary"
circumstances. 38  A "changed circumstance" includes changes in
conditions in the applicant's home country that relate to the applicant's
eligibility for asylum, or the applicant's delayed awareness of those
conditions. 39 An "extraordinary circumstance" includes serious illness or
disability that prevented the applicant from timely filing, including
impairment caused by the effects of persecution or torture.40 An alien
who maintained lawful status (such as a student visa holder) until a
reasonable time before filing the application may also qualify for an
"extraordinary circumstance" exception.4' In all cases, the circumstances
causing the delay must relate directly to the applicant's failure to file the
application on time and the application must be filed within a
"reasonable time" thereafter.42 The decision to grant an exception for
§ 1231 (b)(3). An Immigration Judge may grant withholding of removal to aliens who do not qualify
for asylum but who can show that, on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion, it is more likely than not they would face persecution if
returned to their home country. An alien awarded withholding of removal may live and work in the
United States legally, but may not apply for legal permanent residence or bring family members to
the United States. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16 (2005).
35. 8 U.S.C. § I158(a)(2)(B). The phrase "last arrival" appeared in the final rule without
commentary. Asylum Procedures, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,123-24 (Dec. 6, 2000) (codified at 8 C.F.R. §
208.4(a)(2)(ii)).
36. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(2)(ii) (2005) (emphasis added).
37. See Pistone, supra note 13, at 97-100 (listing numerous reasons why a refugee may delay
filing for asylum, including unfamiliarity with asylum law, fear of retaliation for loved ones back
home, desire to see if conditions in home country improve, and inability or unwillingness to revisit
traumatic events).
38. 8 U.S.C. § I 158(a)(2)(D).
39. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(4).
40. Id. § 208.4(a)(5)(i).
41. Id. § 208.4(a)(5)(iv).
42. Id. § 208.4(a)(4)(ii), (a)(5). "Reasonable time" is a fact-specific inquiry, but in some
situations appears to be significantly less than one year. See, e.g., Tsevegmid v. Ashcroft, 318 F.3d
1226, 1228 (10th Cir. 2003) (noting Immigration Judge's conclusion that an asylum applicant who
arrived on a student visa on February 10, 1998, lost his lawful status when he withdrew from
university classes on April 15, 1998, and applied for asylum on February 16, 1999 did not file a
timely application); In Re Y-C-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 286, 288 (B.I.A. 2002) (filing delay of five months
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changed or extraordinary circumstances is entirely within the discretion
of the immigration official adjudicating the application.43
C. Congress Imposed the One- Year Deadline to Curb Fraudulent
Applications but Did Not Seek to Preclude Legitimate Claims for
Asylum
Congress created the one-year deadline in order to deter certain
abuses of the asylum system. a Prior to IIRIRA, an alien could ask for
asylum at any time after arriving in the United States. a5 In the 1990s,
Congress became increasingly concerned that an alien facing deportation
would assert an asylum claim as a defense, slowing the deportation
process while the asylum grounds were assessed.46 Congress was also
aware that some aliens applied for asylum as a means of obtaining
temporary work authorization.4 ' Because the backlog of un-adjudicated
asylum cases was quite long, an alien could file for asylum and remain
in the country legally for several years, waiting for the application to be
adjudicated. 48 Although 1994 Justice Department regulations expedited
the adjudication process and required applicants to wait 180 days before
receiving work authorization, some lawmakers still claimed that too
many applicants sought asylum for reasons unrelated to fleeing
persecution. °
While Congress acted to discourage frivolous applications, it did not
intend to use the filing deadline to prevent legitimate refugees from
applying for asylum. 51 During floor debates, Senator Patrick Leahy
reasonable where minor asylum seeker was detained in INS custody for more than a year). But see
Diallo v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 1274, 1282 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that an asylee whose asylum
status has been terminated has one year from the date of termination to reapply).
43. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(2)(B).
44. See Khandwala et al., supra note 11, at 4.
45. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1994).
46. See SCHRAG, supra note 24, at 31-32.
47. See SCHRAG, supra note 24, at 31-32; see also H.R. REP. No. 104-469(1), at 116 (1996)
(expressing concern about "visa overstayers" who file for asylum "as a means of remaining in the
United States indefinitely").
48. See SCHRAG, supra note 24, at 33. In 1992, the backlog stood at 244,000 applications. Id. at
45.
49. Employment Authorization, 59 Fed. Reg. 62,284 (Dec. 5, 1994) (codified at 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.7(a)).
50. See Khandwala et al., supra note 11, at 4.
51. See Philip G. Schrag & Michele R. Pistone, The New Asylum Rule: Not Yet a Model of Fair
Procedure, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 267, 269 (1997).
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reminded his colleagues of "America's traditional role as a refuge from
oppression.".52 Senator Orrin Hatch, Chairman of the Judiciary
Committee, stated of the one-year rule: "[I]f the time limit and its
exceptions do not provide adequate protection to those with legitimate
claims of asylum, I will remain committed to revisiting this issue in a
later Congress. 53 In a colloquy prior to the Senate vote, Senator Hatch
further noted, "I am committed to ensuring that those with legitimate
claims of asylum are not returned to persecution, particularly for
technical deficiencies. '54 Senator Spencer Abraham, Chair of the
Senate's Immigration Subcommittee, agreed that the one-year rule
should not be used to deny protection to those with legitimate claims of
persecution. He responded that he planned to "pay close attention" to
how the one-year deadline is interpreted and revisit the issue if the rule
fails to "provide sufficient protection to aliens with bona fide claims of
asylum.,
55
II. U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW DOES NOT DEFINE "ARRIVAL"
Many ordinary words have a technical meaning in the immigration
context.56 Although neither IIRIRA nor the INA defines the word,
"arrival," it is clear that "arrival" is a different concept from "entry" or
"admission., 57 The event of an "entry" or "admission" into the United
States entitles the alien to certain procedural due process rights under the
Constitution before he or she can be removed from the country.58 By
comparison, the event of an "arrival" does not appear to trigger any
enhanced due process rights and applies to those aliens who are
physically within the United States, but have not yet "entered" or been
"admitted" to the country. 59 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
has held that not every border crossing is an "arrival" for purposes of the
52. 142 CONG. REc. S 11904 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
53. 142 CONG. REc. S 11492 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
54. 142 CONG. REC. S 11840 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
55. Id. (statement of Sen. Abraham).
56. See Yuen Sang Low v. Att'y Gen., 479 F.2d 820, 821 (9th Cir. 1973) (stating "we are in the
never-never land of the [INA], where plain words do not always mean what they say").
57. See infra Part I1A.
58. See Gerald Seipp, Law of Entry and Admission: Simple Words Complex Concepts, IMMIGR.
BRIEFINGS, Nov. 2005, at 1; see also Allison Wexler, The Murky Depths of the Entry Fiction
Doctrine: The Plight of Inadmissible Aliens Post-Zadvydas, 25 CARDozo L. REv. 2029, 2032-34
(2004).
59. See infra Part II.A.
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one-year rule. 60 The court reasoned that an alien's return to the United
States after certain temporary trips abroad should not "reset the asylum
clock" on the filing deadline.6'
A. "Arrival" Is a Different Concept from "Entry" or "Admission"
In immigration law, the words "entry," "admission," and "arrival,"
are not synonyms and may not be used interchangeably. "Entry" and
"admission" are legally significant terms, connoting the dividing line
between those aliens who may be removed from the United States in
exclusion proceedings and those who are entitled to deportation hearings
with additional procedural benefits.62 Although IIRIRA revised the
lexicon of immigration terminology, 63 the basic premise that the United
States affords certain constitutional rights only to those categories of
aliens it considers legally "within" its borders remains the same.
64
Not every physical crossing into the United States is an "entry" for
purposes of immigration law. In Matter of Pierre,65 the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) determined that an "entry" required three
elements: (1) physical presence within the United States, (2) inspection
and admission by an immigration officer or actual and intentional
evasion of inspection at the nearest inspection point, and (3) freedom
from official restraint.66 This accepted construction of "entry" permitted
some aliens to be treated as outside the United States, and thus outside
60. See Joaquin-Porras v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 172, 179 (2d Cir. 2006); Lumaj v. Gonzales, 174 F.
App'x 606, 608 (2d Cir. 2006).
61. Joaquin-Porras, 435 F.3d at 180.
62. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 25-27 (1982). Procedural benefits include advance
notice of the charges being brought against the alien, opportunities for appeal, and potential
eligibility for suspension of deportation.
63. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (2000). The amended provision now reads, "The terms
'admission' and 'admitted' mean, with respect to an alien, the lawful entry of the alien into the
United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer."
64. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) ("The distinction between an alien who has
effected an entry into the United States and one who has never entered runs throughout immigration
law."); Chi Thon Ngo v. NS, 192 F.3d 390, 395 (3d Cir. 1999) (Although there are still separate
grounds of 'inadmissibility' and 'deportability,' the distinction [after IIRIRA] now turns on whether
an alien has been 'admitted' to the United States, rather than on whether the alien has gained
'entry.').
65. 14 1. & N. Dec. 467 (B.I.A. 1973).
66. Id. at 468 (finding that Haitian refugees taken into custody of the INS and later paroled into
the custody of a group of local ministers while their application for asylum was pending never
"entered" the country).
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the protection of many of its laws, despite being physically within its
borders. 67 For example, an alien placed in a detention facility upon
arriving at a port of entry, although physically inside the United States,
has not "entered" the country because he or she remains under official
restraint.68 Conversely, an alien who crosses into the United States
without inspection has "entered," despite being in the country
unlawfully.6 9
IIRIRA replaced the concept of "entry" with the concept of
"admission., 70 Prior to IIRIRA, any alien who effected an "entry" into
the United States was entitled to deportation hearings; all other aliens
were subject to exclusion proceedings. 7' Because deportation hearings
contain more procedural safeguards than exclusion proceedings, this
construction of "entry" meant that an alien who "entered" the United
States illegally received more due process rights than an alien
apprehended at the border.72 An "admission" now requires a legal entry
authorized by an immigration officer.73 The primary effect of replacing
"entry" with "admission" is that aliens who enter the United States
illegally have not been "admitted" and are therefore no longer entitled to
more procedural safeguards in removal proceedings than aliens
apprehended at the border.
74
In contrast to the well-defined terms of "entry" and "admission," the
legal significance of an "arrival" must be gleaned from the statute,
regulations, and legislative history. An "arrival" does not appear to
entitle the alien to the same procedural due process rights as a pre-
IIRIRA "entry" or a post-IIRIRA "admission., 75 Federal regulations
67. See Seipp, supra note 58, at 6.
68. See Sidhu v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1160, 1165 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Because [petitioner] was taken
into custody in secondary inspection at LAX, she was never free from official restraint.
Accordingly, she did not effect an entry and was not entitled to a deportation hearing.").
69. See Matter of A-, 9 1. & N. Dec. 356, 357-58 (B.I.A. 1961) (finding stowaway who escaped
from his vessel and remained in the country undetected for two years had made an "entry").
70. IIRIRA § 301, 8 U.S.C. § 1I01(a)(13) (2000).
71. See Seipp, supra note 58, at 6.
72. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 25-27 (1982).
73. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(13).
74. See H.R. REP. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 225 (1996); see also Wexler, supra note 58, at 2038
("Until 1996, 'entry' constituted the dividing line between those aliens who received a
constitutional right to procedural due process, and those who did not.").
75. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1951) ("[A]liens
who have once passed through our gates ... may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to
traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law. But an alien on the threshold of
Vol. 82:149, 2007
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define an "arriving alien" in pertinent part as "an applicant for admission
coming or attempting to come into the United States. 76 Although the
INA does not define "arrival," it distinguishes "arrival" from "entry" and
"admission" in several places. For example, the INA declares that an
alien with valid documentation "to enter the United States" may not
enter if "upon arrival," the alien is determined to be "inadmissible" for
any reason.77 The INA further states that an alien "who arrives in the
United States ... shall be deemed for purposes of this chapter an
applicant for admission."
78
An "arrival" for purposes of the asylum filing deadline appears to
require only the first of the Pierre factors-physical presence within the
United States. 79 The BIA has held that the clock on the one-year
deadline starts running as soon as the alien appears at the border, even if
the alien never "enters" or is "admitted" into the United States.8° In In
Re Y-C-, 81 a fifteen-year-old boy from the People's Republic of China
arrived unaccompanied at a U.S. airport and was immediately placed in
detention pending removal proceedings. 82 Y-C- remained in the custody
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for over a year,
until July 13, 1999, when he was paroled into the custody of an uncle.83
Y-C- filed for asylum in May 2000, less than a year after his release
from INS custody but more than a year after he was initially detained.
84
The BIA concluded, "[i]t is undisputed that the respondent filed his
[asylum application] more than 1 year after his arrival in this country. 85
Because Y-C- was in the custody of INS for more than a year, he never
"entered" or was "admitted" into the country during the one-year
window he had for filing his asylum application. His presence, however,
initial entry stands on a different footing .... ").
76. 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(q) (2005). The regulation further clarifies that an alien paroled into the United
States after 1997 remains an "arriving alien," but an alien who returns pursuant to a grant of
advance parole is not. See id.
77. 8 U.S.C. § 1185(d).
78. Id. § 1225(a)(1) (emphasis added).
79. 14 1. & N. Dec. 467,468 (B.I.A. 1973).
80. In Re Y-C-, 23 1. & N. Dec. 286, 288 (B.I.A. 2002).
81. 23 I. & N. Dec. 286 (B.I.A. 2002).
82. Id. at 286, 288.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 286-87.
85. Id. at 287.
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triggered the one-year asylum clock, even though Y-C- remained under
86
official restraint.
Training materials used by USCIS indicate that the agency may
consider any crossing into the United States an "arrival" for purposes of
the one-year rule.87 The Asylum Officer basic training manual addresses
the situation of an alien who leaves and returns to the United States
before applying for asylum. The manual states: "If an [asylum] applicant
enters the United States on February 2, 2000, leaves the United States on
February 25, 2000, and returns to the United States on March 1, 2000,
the one-year period begins on March 1, 2000.",8 While the training
manual is not binding law,89 it offers guidance into how the agency
interprets its own regulations.9"
B. Presumably, Congress Intentionally Used the Word "Arrival " in
the One- Year Rule Rather than "Entry" or "Admission"
Congress's use of the word "arrival" in the asylum filing deadline is
legally significant. Congress was cognizant of the meaning of the terms
"entry" and "admission" because -it replaced the definition of "entry"
with "admission" in the same piece of legislation in which it imposed the
asylum deadline based on the date of "arrival." 9' It is a basic rule of
statutory construction that "the use of different words or terms within a
statute demonstrates that Congress intended to convey a different
meaning for those words." 92 Therefore, Congress recognized that an
"arrival" is not the same event as an "entry" or an "admission."
86. Id. at 288. In this case, the BIA held Y-C- established "extraordinary circumstances" excusing
his late filing. Id.
87. IMMIGRATION OFFICER ACADEMY, ASYLUM OFFICER BASIC TRAINING COURSE, at 4 (Nov.
30, 2001) available at http://www.asylumlaw.org/docs/unitedstates/one._yearilesson-
March2001 .pdf.
88. Id.
89. See Prokopenko v. Ashcroft, 372 F.3d 941, 944 (8th Cir. 2004) (agency not bound by internal
operating instructions).
90. See, e.g., Matter of Cavazos, 17 1. & N. Dec. 215, 217 (B.I.A. 1980) (noting INS Operations
Instructions may be considered by an Immigration Judge or the BIA).
91. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (2000); see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432
(1987) ("Where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in
another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and
purposefully in the disparate inclusion or exclusion." (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S.
16, 23 (1983))).
92. SEC v. McCarthy, 322 F.3d 650, 656 (9th Cir. 2003).
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Congress presumably used the word "arrival" in the one-year rule in
order to include those aliens who are present in the United States but
who have never "entered" or been "admitted. 93 Aliens may apply for
asylum regardless of whether they are in the United States legally.
94
Replacing "arrival" with "admission" would preclude those aliens who
entered the United States unlawfully from asking for asylum, because a
lawful entry is required for admission. 95 Similarly, replacing "arrival"
with "entry" would exclude those aliens apprehended at the border who
ask for asylum: (1) at a port of entry, (2) while under official restraint, or
(3) after being paroled into the country.96 By using the word "arrival,"
Congress signaled that any alien present in the United States or at the
border may ask for asylum, regardless of his or her manner of entry or
immigration status.
C. The Second Circuit Holds That Not Every Border Crossing Is an
"Arrival "for Purposes of the Asylum Filing Deadline
To date, among the federal courts of appeals, only the Second Circuit
has explicitly considered the meaning of the word "arrival" in the one-
year asylum filing rule.97 In Joaquin-Porras v. Gonzales,98 the court held
that a three-week trip abroad pursuant to a grant of advance parole by
immigration authorities did not result in a new "arrival" date upon
return. 99 In Lumaj v. Gonzales,'00 a subsequent unpublished decision, the
court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction a portion of an asylum appeal
relating to the timeliness of an asylum application.'01 Before dismissing
that portion of the case, the court noted that it agreed with the
Immigration Judge's decision to disregard the petitioner's brief trip to
93. See Beth Lyon, Fighting a Deadline on Fear: Asylum Practice Update as the One-Year
Deadline Approaches, 75 INTERPRETER RELEASES 285, 286 (Jan-June 1998).
94. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (2000).
95. Id. § 1 101(a)(13); see also supra Part II.A.
96. See, e.g., Sidhu v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1160, 1165 (9th Cir. 2004); Assa'ad v. U.S. Att'y Gen.,
332 F.3d 1321, 1326-27 (11 th Cir. 2003).
97. See Joaquin-Porras v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 172, 179 (2d Cir. 2006); Lumaj v. Gonzales, 174 F.
App'x 606, 608 (2d Cir. 2006).
98. 435 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2006).
99. Id. at 179.
100. 174 F. App'x 606 (2d Cir. 2006).
101. Id. at 608. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the federal courts' jurisdiction.
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Canada when determining the date of the petitioner's "last arrival" to the
United States.
10 2
In Joaquin-Porras, the court held that the petitioner's recent return
from a visit to his home country was not his "last arrival" for purposes of
his asylum claim.10 3 Joaquin-Porras entered the United States lawfully in
1991 and resided in Ithaca, New York for nearly ten years except for a
few brief visits to his home country of Costa Rica. 10 4 In 2000, he
traveled to Costa Rica for three weeks after receiving advance parole to
re-enter the United States. 10 5 He returned on January 27, 2000 and
applied for asylum slightly less than a year later, on January 18, 2001.06
The Immigration Judge rejected the application as untimely and the BIA
summarily affirmed. 10 7 On appeal, the Second Circuit rejected Joaquin-
Porras's argument that the Immigration Judge improperly refused to
calculate his asylum deadline as one year from the date of his return
from his most recent trip to Costa Rica.10 8 While reasoning that an alien
could make more than one "arrival," the court stated, "it is anything but
self-evident that the phrase 'arrival in the United States' refers to any
and all border crossings into the country."'
10 9
The court noted that the phrase "last arrival in the United States" had
appeared before, in a 1966 immigration statute. 1 That statute provided
for the adjustment of status for certain Cuban nationals based on the
applicant's "last arrival" date."' The statute expressly stated that a
temporary absence from the United States should be disregarded for
purposes of calculating the "last arrival" date if the applicant departed
"with no intention of abandoning his or her residence.""' 2 In the
102. Lumaj, 174 F. App'x at 608.
103. Joaquin-Porras, 435 F.3d at 179.
104. Id. at 175.
105. Id. Aliens awaiting adjustment of immigration status are generally advised to apply for
advance parole before leaving the country. See supra note 7. At the time of his 2000 trip to Costa
Rica, Joaquin-Porras was awaiting adjustment of his immigration status based on marriage to an
American citizen. His spouse later admitted the marriage was fraudulent and withdrew the
application for adjustment of status. See Joaquin-Porras, 435 F.3d at 174-75.
106. Joaquin-Porras, 435 F.3d at 175.
107. Id. at 174.
108. Id. at 178-79.
109. Id. at 179.
110. Id.
111. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(4)(ii)).
112. Id.; see also Matter of Baez-Ayala, 13 I. & N. Dec. 79, 82-83 (B.I.A. 1968) ("[A]
subsequent arrival after a temporary absence from the United States with no intention to abandon
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Joaquin-Porras decision, the court reasoned that the phrase "last arrival"
in the federal regulations for the one-year filing deadline implicitly
included such an exception." 3 Concluding that Joaquin-Porras's brief
absence was undertaken with no intent to abandon his residence in the
United States, the court found that his temporary absence should
similarly be disregarded for purposes of determining his "last arrival"
date. 11
4
In reaching its decision, the court reasoned that "[p]ermitting
applicants to reset the asylum clock by taking a short excursion abroad
would undermine the one-year deadline's clear purpose of focusing the
asylum process on those who have recently fled persecution in their
home countries."' 1 5 Although Joaquin-Porras based his claim for asylum
in part on an incident that occurred during his most recent visit to Costa
Rica,1 16 the court determined that his temporary absence pursuant to
advance parole did not warrant a new "arrival" date upon return.
17
Instead, the court affirmed the Immigration Judge's decision that April
1, 1997, the effective date of the regulation, was the proper starting point
for the one-year deadline for those aliens present in the United States
when IIRIRA was enacted." 8
Similarly, in Lumaj, the Second Circuit noted with approval the
Immigration Judge's decision to disregard a short trip outside the United
States when calculating the proper "last arrival" date on Lumaj's
application for asylum. 19 The court dismissed the portion of Lumaj's
appeal regarding the timeliness of her application for lack of
jurisdiction. 20 Before dismissing, however, the court concluded the
Immigration Judge was reasonable in disregarding Lumaj's claimed last
residence in the United States does not constitute the "last arrival" within [the 1966 Act].").
113. Joaquin-Porras, 435 F.3d at 179.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 180.
116. Id. at 175. Joaquin-Porras sought asylum because of persecution in Costa Rica on account of
his homosexuality. He claimed the police illegally detained and verbally assaulted him during his
2000 visit. The Immigration Judge declined to grant an exception for changed circumstances and the
Second Circuit dismissed review of that portion of his appeal for lack ofjurisdiction. Id. at 174-75.
117. Id. at 179.
118. Id. at 176, 179.
119. 174 F. App'x 606, 608 (2d Cir. 2006).
120. Id. The Lumaj court acknowledged its jurisdiction over issues of statutory interpretation, but
found that Lumaj had not raised any such issue. See infra Part IV.
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arrival date because that entry "followed a brief trip to Canada rather
than a flight from persecution."'
12 1
III. FLEUTI PERMITTED SOME ALIENS TO TRAVEL ABROAD
WITHOUT MAKING A NEW "ENTRY" UPON RETURN
The problems encountered applying the concept of "arrival" to the
one-year asylum deadline are familiar from other areas of immigration
law. In the 1963 case of Rosenberg v. Fleuti, the U.S. Supreme Court
concluded that an LPR does make an "entry" upon returning from an
"innocent, casual, and brief' trip abroad. 122 The Court reasoned that
Congress did not intend to subject an LPR who takes a short trip outside
the country to the same scrutiny at the border as an alien who does not
have LPR status or an alien attempting to enter the United States for the
first time. 123 Although Congress revised the concept of "entry" in
IIRIRA, 124 the Fleuti doctrine remains useful as an example of the way
seemingly straightforward terms like "entry" can present complicated
issues in immigration law and should be construed according to
legislative intent.
A. Fleuti Held that an LPR Did Not Make an "Entry " when Returning
from an "Innocent, Casual, and Brief" Excursion Abroad
In Fleuti, the U.S. Supreme Court held that an LPR who left the
country for an "innocent, casual, and brief' trip was not required to seek
"entry" at the border upon return. 25 Fleuti, a Swiss national and LPR,
visited Mexico for a few hours in 1956.126 Three years later, the INS
tried to deport Fleuti on the grounds that he had been inadmissible at the
time of his 1956 "re-entry" into the United States because he was
"afflicted with psychopathic personality" on account of his
homosexuality. 127 Because Congress did not make homosexuality
121. Lumaj, 174 F. App'x at 608.
122. 374 U.S. 449, 462 (1963).
123. Id. at 461-62.
124. See 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(13)(A) (2000).
125. Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 462.
126. Id. at 450.
127. Id. at 450-51. Fleuti challenged these grounds as unconstitutionally vague and the Ninth
Circuit agreed. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court avoided reaching the constitutional question by instead
finding that Fleuti's return from Mexico was not an "entry." Id.
Vol. 82:149, 2007
Asylum Filing Deadline
grounds for exclusion until after Fleuti's initial entry in 1952,128 the
question of Fleuti's deportability turned on whether his return from
Mexico in 1956 could be characterized as an "entry." 129 If his 1956
border crossing was an "entry," that entry was an inadmissible entry and
he could be deported on that basis. If his 1956 return was not an "entry,"
Fleuti was not inadmissible at the time of his 1952 entry, and therefore
could not be deported on those grounds.1
30
The Court examined the definition of "entry" in the INA to reach its
decision that Fleuti's afternoon excursion was not so "meaningfully
interruptive" of his stay in the United States as to require evaluating him
for inadmissibility at the border. 3 ' Until IIRIRA, the INA defined
"entry" in pertinent part as "any coming of an alien into the United
States except" that an LPR will not be regarded as making an "entry" if
the LPR can show that "his departure... was not intended or reasonably
to be expected... by him."' 32 The Court considered this "intent
exception" written into the definition of "entry." It reasoned that an
"unintentional" departure included one in which the LPR did not intend
or evidence an intent to abandon his or her residency in the United
States. 133 An "innocent, casual, and brief' journey, the Court concluded,
should be treated for purposes of the immigration laws as not a departure
at all.
134
B. The Fleuti Court Examined Legislative Intent with Regard to
"Entry"
The Fleuti Court construed the "intent exception" in the definition of
"entry" according to Congress's intent to mitigate the harsh
consequences of requiring LPRs to seek an "entry" every time they
returned to the United States from abroad. 35 Requiring an alien to make
a new "entry" after every border crossing could result in severe
consequences for two reasons. First, in some circumstances the grounds
128. The Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952), did not
become effective until three months after Fleuti entered the country. See Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 453.
129. Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 452-53 n.2.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 462.
132. INA § lOl(a)(13) (emphasis added).




for exclusion were broader than the grounds for deportation.136 Thus, in
1956, someone like Fleuti could be excluded from entering the United
States for being a homosexual, but could not be deported on the same
grounds. 137 Second, for aliens convicted of certain crimes, deportability
frequently hinged on the number of years that elapsed between
"entering" the country and committing the crime. 138 Under both of these
circumstances, attempting to leave and re-enter the United States could
result in removal for aliens who otherwise would not be subject to
deportation.1 39 Thus, a strict construction of "entry" essentially
prevented certain aliens from ever setting foot outside the country if they
wished to continue to reside in the United States.
Congress added the "intent exception" to the definition of "entry" in
1952;140 in so doing, it noted with approval previous court decisions
interpreting the word "entry" in a manner which spared LPRs from
having to seek an "entry" following unforeseen or involuntary
departures.' 4' For example, in 1947 the Second Circuit refused to uphold
the deportation order of a longtime LPR when his train from Buffalo to
Detroit passed, unbeknownst to him, through Canada in the middle of
the night. 142 The same year, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the
deportation order of an LPR who was taken to Cuba for a week to
recuperate after his merchant ship was torpedoed in the Panama Canal
during World War 11.143 In both cases, the alien had a criminal
conviction which would render him deportable if the court applied a
strict interpretation of "entry.'"
In Fleuti, the Court noted that Congress added the "intent exception"
to avoid unfairly subjecting LPRs to the "irrational hazards" caused by
requiring an "entry" with every border crossing, regardless of the
136. See Cabasug v. INS, 847 F.2d 1321, 1323 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Many grounds for
exclusion ... are not grounds for deportation if they come into existence after lawful admission into
the United States.").
137. Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 460.
138. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(i) (1994) (making conviction of a crime of moral
turpitude within five years of entry (or 10 years for an LPR) a deportable offense).
139. See Michael D. Patrick, The Diminuition of the 'Fleuti'Doctrine, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 23, 1998 at
3.
140. INA § 101(a)(13).
141. See Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 458.
142. DiPasquale v. Karnuth, 158 F.2d 878, 879 (2d Cir. 1947).
143. Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947).
144. DiPasqaule, 158 F.2d at 878; Delgadillo, 332 U.S. at 389-90.
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circumstances surrounding the departure. 145 In light of the "momentous"
interests at stake for LPRs, many of whom had lived in the United States
since childhood, the Fleuti Court reasoned that Congress intended the
"intent exception" to apply not only to unforeseen or involuntary
departures, but to insignificant absences as well. 146 The Fleuti Court
stated, "it effectuates congressional purpose to construe the intent
exception.., as meaning an intent to depart in a manner which can be
regarded as meaningfully interruptive of the alien's permanent
residence.' 47 The Court's interpretation of the "intent exception"
permitted LPRs to travel abroad without necessarily being subjected to
the legal consequences of an "entry" upon return. 148
C. Congress Addressed the Fleuti Doctrine in IIRIRA
After Fleuti, the lower courts attempted to define an "innocent,
casual, and brief excursion" on a case by case basis. 49 The Fleuti Court
identified three factors it considered important when determining
whether a trip abroad required the LPR to seek "entry" at the border: the
duration of the excursion, the purpose of the excursion, and whether the
excursion required the procurement of travel documents. 50 However,
the Court noted that a complete list of relevant factors "remains to be
developed by the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion."' 51
Ultimately, the lower courts determined that a trip abroad could be
significantly longer than Fleuti's and still not meaningfully interrupt the
LPRs presence in the United States.
52
In IIRIRA, Congress replaced "entry" with "admission" and codified
a portion of the Fleuti doctrine in a statutory framework for determining
145. Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 459.
146. Id.; see also Patrick, supra note 139, at 3.
147. Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 462.
148. See id.
149. See Tineo v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 382, 385 (3d Cir. 2003) (referring to "over three decades of
practice based on the Fleuti doctrine").
150. Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 462 (quoting Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877) (internal
quoations omitted)).
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., Jubilado v. United States, 819 F.2d 210, 214 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that LPR's
return from three months in the Philippines to bring wife and children to the United States was not
an "entry"); ltzcovitz v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 6, 447 F.2d 888, 894 (2d Cir. 1971) (finding
that LPR's return from three-week business trip to Israel was not an "entry").
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when an LPR must seek "admission" into the United States.'53 The
amended INA states that a returning LPR "shall not be regarded as
seeking an admission" at the border unless he or she falls into one of six
enumerated exceptions. Such exceptions include departing in a manner
intended to abandon or relinquish LPR status or being absent from the
United States for a continuous period of more than 180 days. 154 In 2003,
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the Fleuti doctrine
did not survive the enactment of IRRIRA and the "innocent, casual, and
brief' framework no longer applies to returning LPRs. 55 Nevertheless,
the Fleuti doctrine remains important as an example of the way courts
have addressed the issues raised by immigration laws that link
consequences to the date of "entry."
IV. FEDERAL COURTS HAVE JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER
THE PROPER MEANING OF THE WORD "ARRIVAL"
Until recently, the federal courts lacked jurisdiction to review
determinations related to the timeliness of an asylum application.' 56 In
2005, Congress enacted the REAL ID Act, which states that provisions
in IIRIRA limiting federal court jurisdiction should not be read as
precluding review of questions of law. 157 Questions of law include issues
of statutory interpretation.1 58 The proper meaning of the term "arrival" in
the filing deadline is an issue of statutory interpretation.' 59 Therefore,
where the meaning of the phrase "last arrival" is in dispute, the federal
courts of appeal have jurisdiction to review the one-year deadline.1 60
153. IRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 301(a), 110 Stat. 3009-575 (1996) (to be codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)); see also H.R. REP. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 225-26 (1996) (stating that the
revision "preserves a portion of the Fleuti doctrine" while intending "to overturn certain
interpretations of Fleuti").
154. 8 U.S.C. § 110i(a)(13)(C) (2000).
155. Tineo v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 382, 396 (3d Cir. 2003).
156. 8 U.S.C. § 11 58(a)(3) ("No court shall have jurisdiction to review any determination of the
Attorney General under [the one-year bar for asylum applications].").
157. REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 302 (2005) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(2)(D)).
158. See Chen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 434 F.3d 144, 154 (2d Cir. 2006).




A. The REAL ID Act Confers Jurisdiction over Issues of Statutory
Construction in IIRIRA to the Federal Courts
IIRIRA stripped the federal courts of jurisdiction to review any
decisions related to the timeliness of an asylum application or the
existence of changed or exceptional circumstances.1 61 The law states that
"[n]o court shall have jurisdiction to review any determination"
regarding the one-year filing deadline.1 62 The federal courts must
dismiss challenges to an immigration official's determination that an
asylum seeker did or did not meet the burden of showing he or she filed
the application within one year of arrival or qualified for an exception to
the deadline for changed or extraordinary circumstances. 
163
The jurisdictional landscape of the asylum filing rule changed in 2005
with the REAL ID Act.1 64 Section 106(a) of the REAL ID Act conferred
jurisdiction to the federal courts of appeal over "constitutional claims or
questions of law."'1 65 The statute did not specify what it considers to be a
question of law. However, the REAL ID Act's legislative history makes
clear that Congress intended "questions of law" to include questions of
statutory interpretation. 166 In enacting section 106(a) of the REAL ID
Act, Congress was responding to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
INS v. St. Cyr,167 which held that IIRIRA did not preclude federal district
courts from hearing habeas corpus petitions brought by an alien in
custody pursuant to an order of deportation. 168 The Court concluded that
questions of law reviewable on habeas may not be limited without an
express statement by Congress that it intended to preclude such
review. 169 The Court stated that "a serious Suspension Clause issue
would be presented" if the Court were to conclude that Congress had
161. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3) (2000).
162. Id.
163. See, e.g., Chen, 434 F.3d at 151 (dismissing a timeliness appeal for lack of jurisdiction and
noting that "our sister circuits have uniformly recognized that we lack jurisdiction to review an
asylum application that the BIA has deemed untimely or as to which the BIA has found neither
changed nor extraordinary circumstances excusing the untimeliness").
164. REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 106(a)(1)(A)(iii), 119 Stat. 231, 310 (2005) (to be
codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D)).
165. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (West 2005).
166. See H.R. REP. No. 109-72, at 175 (2005) (Conf. Rep.).
167. 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
168. Id. at 297.
169. Id. at 299.
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completely withdrawn habeas jurisdiction from the courts without
providing an adequate substitute. 170
The REAL ID Act consolidated in the federal courts of appeal review
over those issues historically exercised by district courts through habeas,
including issues of statutory construction.1 71 The statute states that
provisions in the INA which limit or eliminate judicial review shall not
be construed as precluding review over "constitutional claims or
questions of law" filed in a court of appeals. 172 Thus, under the REAL
ID Act, federal courts of appeal have jurisdiction to consider issues of
statutory interpretation raised in petitions for review of asylum claims. 
173
B. The Proper "Arrival" Date to Use in Calculating the One-Year
Deadline Is a Question of Statutory Interpretation
The legal meaning of the word "arrival" in the one-year asylum
deadline is a question of statutory interpretation, and as such is a
question of law over which the federal courts have jurisdiction. 174 The
proper date to use in calculating the beginning of the one-year period
involves no exercise of judgment or executive discretion.175 An applicant
may have only one "last arrival" date. By analogy, in determining
whether an alien met the requirements for a grant of discretionary relief
based on a statutory time period, the Ninth Circuit stated, "Here, either
the petitioner has been continuously present in the United States for ten
years or the petitioner has not. As our answer to the question posed by
this case turns solely upon statutory interpretation, we have
jurisdiction."' 7 6 Similarly, which date is the legally significant "last
170. Id. at 305.
171. H.R. REP. No. 109-172(1) at 175 (explaining that "the purpose of [§ 106] is to permit
judicial review over those issues that were historically reviewable on habeas-constitutional and
statutory-construction questions"), cited in Chen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 434 F.3d 144, 154 (2d Cir.
2006).
172. REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 106(a)(1)(A)(iii), 119 Stat. 231, 310 (2005) (to be
codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D)).
173. See Chen, 434 F.3d at 153; Ramadan v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir. 2005).
174. See Joaquin-Porras v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 172, 178 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[T]he proper
interpretation of the one-year deadline provision.., is a question of law over which we have
jurisdiction under the REAL ID Act.").
175. Lagandaon v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2004).
176. The court was called on to answer whether the petitioner accrued ten years of continuous




arrival" date turns on the construction of the word "arrival," a non-
discretionary question of law.
177
V. COURTS SHOULD INTERPRET "ARRIVAL" SO AS NOT TO
DENY ASYLUM TO LEGITIMATE REFUGEES
The one-year rule for asylum applications leaves unanswered the
question of whether every crossing into the United States is considered
an "arrival" for purposes of the filing deadline. 78 In the absence of a
clear definition, courts should interpret "arrival" according to legislative
intent. Congress did not intend to preclude legitimate refugees from
seeking asylum. 179 Therefore, it comports with legislative intent to
presume an asylum seeker "arrived" in the United States if the excursion
abroad was "meaningfully interruptive" of the previous stay. As with the
Fleuti doctrine, the full list of relevant factors for evaluating multiple
"arrivals" should be developed through the judicial process.
A. The Meaning of "Arrival" Is Unclear
Neither the asylum statute nor the federal regulations squarely address
which date should be deemed the applicable "arrival" date where an
alien applies for asylum after leaving and returning to the United
States. 80 The use of the qualifier "last" in the federal regulations
indicates that an alien could make more than one "arrival" into the
United States.' 81 But it does not compel the conclusion that an alien is
considered to have made an "arrival" with each and every crossing into
the United States. 182 By adopting the term "arrival" without including an
explicit discussion of the "re-entry" problem, Congress invited the same
type of analysis as developed under the Fleuti doctrine.
Recent case law indicates that the phrase "last arrival" is bound to go
through the same interpretive process as developed under the Fleuti line
of cases. In Joaquin-Porras, the Second Circuit held that an alien does
not make an "arrival" when returning from a three-week trip abroad
177. SeeJoaquin-Porras, 435 F.3d at 178.
178. 8 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2)(B) (2000); 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(2)(ii) (2005).
179. See supra Part I.C.
180. 8 U.S.C. § 11 58(a)(2)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(2)(ii).
181. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(2)(ii).
182. Joaquin-Porras, 435 F.3d at 179.
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taken pursuant to a grant of advance parole.' 83 In order to effectuate
congressional intent to focus asylum on those who have recently fled
persecution, the Second Circuit also indicated that it would disregard an
asylum seeker's "brief trip to Canada" when calculating the filing
deadline.
1 84
B. Congress Did Not Intend to Preclude Legitimate Claims ofAsylum
While Congress created the deadline in response to concerns about
misuse of the asylum process, it did not intend to use the filing deadline
as a way to deny protection to bona fide refugees.' 85 Congress remained
mindful of the United States' commitment to refugees under its
international treaty obligations 86 and its longstanding role as a "refuge
from oppression. ' 87 Lawmakers expressed concern that the one-year
rule might be used to deny protection to those with legitimate claims of
persecution. 88 Key supporters of the bill agreed that Congress should
closely monitor implementation of the one-year rule to verify that those
with genuine claims of asylum were not turned away because of
"technical deficiencies" with their applications.1 89 Therefore, it accords
with legislative intent to construe "arrival" in a manner which minimizes
the possibility that a legitimate asylum seeker will be denied review of
the merits of their asylum application.
C. Construing a Limited Intent Exception into the Meaning of
"Arrival" Best Comports with Congressional Intent
As the U.S. Supreme Court did in Fleuti, courts should construe
"arrival" according to legislative intent. 90 In Fleuti, the U.S. Supreme
Court reasoned that it effectuated congressional intent to construe
"entry" to permit LPRs to return to the United States after "innocent,
casual, and brief' trips abroad without the return constituting an
183. Id.
184. Lumaj v. Gonzales, 174 F. App'x 606, 608 (2d Cir. 2006).
185. See supra Part I.C.
186. See supra Part I.A.
187. 142 CONG. REC. S11904 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
188. See Khandwala et al., supra note 11, at 4.
189. 142 CONG. REc. S11840 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
190. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 457-62 (1963).
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"entry."' 9' This interpretation permitted LPRs to travel abroad without
risking being denied permission to re-enter the United States upon
return. 92 Congress recognized that a strict application of "entry" could
produce harsh or unintended consequences for LPRs, who have a vested
interest in maintaining their permanent residency in the United States.193
Likewise, courts should recognize the "momentous" interests at stake for
aliens who may be refugees facing a return to persecution.
1 94
It comports with legislative intent to recognize two circumstances in
which a return to the United States is not an "arrival" under the one-year
rule. First, as the Second Circuit concluded, it would defeat the rule's
purpose to permit an asylum seeker to circumvent the filing deadline by
traveling across the border for the sole purpose of "reset[ting] the
asylum clock" on an asylum application.' 95 In addition, because the
federal regulations explicitly exclude those aliens returning to the
country under a grant of advance parole from the definition of "arriving
alien,"'196 the one-year rule should disregard short excursions undertaken
pursuant to advance parole obtained prior to departure from the United
States.' 97
However, where an alien departs the United States in a manner
intended to be "meaningfully interruptive"' 98 of his or her stay in the
United States, any subsequent return to the United States should be
treated as a new "arrival." Congress clearly recognized that an asylum
seeker may make more than one "arrival" into the United States and
intended only the last "arrival" to trigger the filing deadline.' 99
Moreover, USCIS instructs its asylum officers to consider the most
recent return as the "last arrival" date when the alien leaves and returns
to the United States.2 °° Congress imposed the filing deadline primarily to
prevent aliens from asserting spurious claims of asylum as a stalling
191. Id. at 462.
192. Id. at 462; see also supra Part III.B.
193. Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 456-58 (1963).
194. Id. at 458.
195. Joaquin-Porras v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 172, 180 (2d Cir. 2006).
196. 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(q) (2005).
197. In both of these circumstances, the asylum seeker could still seek a changed or extraordinary
circumstances exception to the filing deadline. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) (2000).
198. Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 462.
199. Joaquin-Porras, 435 F.3d at 179.
200. See IMMIGRATION OFFICER ACADEMY, supra note 87, at 4.
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tactic when facing deportation. 20 1 It therefore accords with the rule's
purpose to construe "arrival" to include any return to the United States
where the alien previously departed with the intent to abandon or
otherwise make a meaningful break with his or her residence in the
United States.
VI. CONCLUSION
An alien has one year from the date of last "arrival" to apply for
asylum. Neither IIRIRA nor the INA defines the word "arrival," but the
Second Circuit has recently held that not every border crossing is an
"arrival" for purposes of the one-year deadline. In a different context,
the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that an LPR does not make an
"entry" into the United States when returning from an "innocent, casual,
and brief excursion" abroad. The Court reasoned that it effectuated
congressional intent to disregard an LPR's brief absence when the LPR
did not intend to abandon residency in the United States. Whereas the
Fleuti doctrine evolved to the benefit of the LPR, the Second Circuit's
decision to disregard certain types of travel when considering an asylum
seeker's last "arrival" date works to the detriment of the asylum seeker.
Regardless, the Fleuti doctrine is an obvious analogy for the way the
concepts of "entry" and "arrival" present difficult issues in immigration
law and should be interpreted to effectuate legislative intent.
Reading a limited "intent exception" into the meaning of "arrival"
best comports with the congressional purpose behind the one-year
deadline for asylum applications. Submitting a timely application is only
the first hurdle for those seeking asylum. The asylum seeker still must
prove that he or she is credible, qualifies as a refugee, and is not
ineligible on other grounds. For Dinesh, who left the United States in
2005 intending to return to Nepal permanently, his subsequent return as
a refugee should be treated as a new arrival under immigration law.
Congress enacted the filing deadline to reduce the number of unfounded
claims for asylum, but did not intend to preclude legitimate refugees
from seeking asylum in the United States. Rejecting Dinesh's
application as untimely because he previously lived in the United States
demonstrates that the filing deadline is being applied in a manner
contrary to congressional intent, and unfaithful to the goals of U.S.
asylum policy.
201. See supra Part I.C.
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